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Editorial
Public inquiries into health care in the UK:
a sound basis for policy-making?
The Francis Inquiry 2013
‘Patients died due to appalling care’, ‘Union chiefs call
for head of NHS to resign’, ‘Families of the dead are
calling for criminal prosecutions’. Headlines such as
these have dominated discussion and debate about
health services in England since the publication in
February of the ﬁndings of an oﬃcial inquiry into
poor quality care in one small acute NHS hospital,
Staﬀord General.1 The inquiry, carried out by leading
lawyer Robert Francis, had been established by the
incoming Coalition Government in 2010 to investigate
the commissioning, supervisory and regulatory bodies
responsible for the hospital. The shortcomings in care
at the hospital had already been thoroughly docu-
mented in an earlier inquiry also led by Robert
Francis, published earlier that year.2
History of public inquiries
Public inquiries into the quality of health care facilities
have a long history in England and Wales, going back
to 19th century investigations of workhouse inﬁrm-
aries.3 However, modern use of this means of assessing
and understanding failings in care has its origins in the
inquiry into Ely Hospital, Cardiﬀ in 1969, a facility for
people with learning diﬃculties. Over the following 20
years, aside from many local inquiries, 15 national
inquiries into individual hospitals were undertaken.4
Since the late 1980s, inquiries have rather faded from
fashion as both routine quantitative monitoring of
quality and performance management of institutions
have become established. The principal exception was
the inquiry into paediatric cardiac surgery in Bristol in
the 1990s.5
Purposes of public inquiries
In the face of public knowledge of a health care organ-
ization’s failings, governments in the UK have chosen
to hold public inquiries for several reasons. They may
be held to allay public alarm, or to discover the
‘facts’ concerning individuals’ and/or organizations’
behaviour, or to explain personal and/or organizational
failings as a basis for developing higher standards of
care and reforming policy. Governments may also use
inquiries to gain advantage over political opponents
with the aim of exposing the latter’s past failings. For
example, it seems unlikely that the second Francis
Inquiry would have been established if the previous
Labour Government had remained in power.
Regardless of the primary objective, the common aim
of all inquiries is to shake up the institution in question
and to de-freeze established patterns of management
and practice so as to facilitate change. Inquiries are
not in themselves capable of initiating and implement-
ing improvements. The most they can do is focus atten-
tion on an issue and recommend change to the
appropriate authorities. Despite this, there is usually
an assumption that they will lead to changes in policy.
Form of public inquiries
The form and conduct of public inquiries into health
care vary widely, partly determined by the primary pur-
pose. Most, but not all, are led by a judge or senior
lawyer who may or may not have experience of health
care matters. Such lawyers will often forego substantial
personal earnings to take on this public role, motivated
by a mix of altruism and self-advancement. The ﬁrst
modern health care inquiry, into Ely Hospital, was
led by a politically ambitious lawyer, Geoﬀrey Howe,
who went on to become Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Others may have less lofty aspirations. In some inqui-
ries, the lawyer or judge chairs a small group composed
of relevant health care experts such as a senior specialist
doctor, nurse and non-clinical manager. However, in
other inquiries, such specialist experts act purely as
assessors or advisors rather than as equal members of
a team. And in rare instances, the lawyer acts alone
without assistance from those with expertise and
experience of health care, as was the case in the
recent Francis Inquiry, suggesting it was perceived by
its architects as a process in which specialist knowledge
of clinical and non-clinical aspects of patient care and
the wider system was not required in making judgments
or even a potential handicap in providing an independ-
ent assessment. Given that the ﬁrst Francis inquiry was
focused on establishing the facts about the very poor
standard of care, whereas the second was ostensibly
about the systems of supervision and external regula-
tion that had allowed poor care to occur, the absence of
specialist expertise within the inquiry team itself seems
surprising.
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The nature of evidence in public inquiries
Unlike in a British criminal court, health care staﬀ,
patients and their relatives are generally questioned
by a single advocate acting for the inquiry. While wit-
nesses’ views and testimony may be questioned, this is
with the aim of clariﬁcation rather than as part of the
challenge and counter-challenge of a British court.
There is no provision for contentious issues to be
explored explicitly through the involvement of people
with alternative perspectives. For example, in the
Francis Inquiry, the originators of hospital all-cause
standardized mortality ratios argued for their validity
as measures of the overall quality of care of a hospital
that the hospital board should have responded to, with-
out other experts having the opportunity to challenge
such a view.
Comparison with research
From a researcher’s perspective, it is striking how little
attention seems to be given to the selection of the mem-
bership, methods and processes of public inquiries in
the UK. At a recent seminar, those who had led public
inquiries described the often hurried, ad hoc and infor-
mal ways in which inquiries have been established, pro-
cesses which seemed greatly at odds with their serious
subject matter and implications.6 A research project
with a similar size of budget (say, the 13 million of
the second Francis report) would have required a
detailed proposal with a justiﬁcation of the budget, sev-
eral independent peer reviewers and the deliberation of
a multi-disciplinary funding committee before any deci-
sion to proceed. The objectives (terms of reference in
inquiry terms) would have been scrutinized, as would
the composition of the team and the methods, for their
ability to answer the questions posed.
Impact of public inquiries
There have been no formal evaluations of inquiries to
establish their cost and impact (i.e. their value) and the
question of value is rarely mentioned even after the
event.7,8 Given that some are undertaken for purposes
that are diﬃcult to measure, such as to allay public
concerns, it can be diﬃcult in some cases to determine
their value. Whether the impact of such policy-making
goes beyond assuaging the public and media calls for
some action to be taken is unclear.
A sound basis for policy?
In some cases, speciﬁc and long-lasting changes in
policy occur following inquiries; in 1969, the
Government’s response to the Ely Hospital inquiry
was to establish a long stay hospital inspectorate and
to commit to reducing the number of people living in
such hospitals, a move mirrored in 2013 by the creation
of a Chief Inspector of Hospitals in response to the
Francis Inquiry. The Ely inquiry is generally regarded
as a ‘success’. However, the impact of the Ely inquiry
has to be judged in light of an already mounting tide of
research evidence and opinion in favour of ‘desinstitu-
tionalization’. It is diﬃcult to ascertain the precise con-
tribution of the inquiry.
Whether an inquiry, which in research terms is an
extended case study, should inﬂuence wider policy dir-
ectly without taking other evidence into account is
questionable. For example, Robert Francis undertook
no comparisons with other hospitals, action that would
have enabled him to determine if there were causal
associations between the unsatisfactory management
and regulation of services he identiﬁed at Staﬀord and
the poor humanity of care many patients suﬀered. In
this regard, this recent inquiry is no diﬀerent to all its
antecedents.
Whether or not a public inquiry is a sound basis for
policy-making, it is clear that any recommendations
should be few in number, focusing on priorities,
rather than trying to be comprehensive, and should
be implementable at a reasonable cost. The contrast
could hardly be greater between the 1969 Ely
Hospital report (12 pages and a few important recom-
mendations) and the Francis Report of 2013 (almost
2000 pages and 290 recommendations). Among this
plethora of suggestions are many based solely on the
judgement of Francis himself for which there is no evi-
dence of their potential eﬀectiveness let alone any con-
sideration of their cost, a basic requirement for any
other type of policy-making.
There is a case for treating public inquiries more like
research projects and ‘normal’ public policy interven-
tions, and thus subject to some more exacting form of
ex ante and ex post value for money assessment if they
are to be judged in terms of their contribution to policy
and service improvement. However, perhaps such criti-
cisms of public inquiries are ultimately misplaced (des-
pite the inﬂuence they often have). Instead they should
be recognized as public exercises in carthasis, a way of
purging public anger whilst also highlighting areas of
serious concern and policy failure that need
remediation.
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